

Assignment Submission and Tutor Feedback Report

Students must attach a copy of this form to each piece of submitted work after completing Sections A and C: Sections B and D to be completed by University Staff

PART TIME STUDENT

**Section A**

Student's Name RICHARD S. ROBINSON Registration No FC4 04390

Course Humanities/Politics Course Code FC226 Year 6 Final year

Module Title THE POLITICS OF ANTI-IMPERIALISM Module Ref FPT 304 Semester B 2000

Assignment Title THE REVALUATIONS OF 1989 <sup>EXISTENTIAL CRISIS</sup> DEMAND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF COMMUNAL IDENTITY

Tutor's Name RICK SIMON Date Due 5.4.00 Seminar Group (1st) 1-3

I certify this submission does not contravene the University Code of Practice on Academic Irregularities.

**Section B**

Tutor's Comments Terrific - as good an essay as I've read.

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

Agreed - possibly even better! <sup>1st</sup> thing

Assessed by R. Simon Mark 80

Returned to student 2/5/00

'The revolutions of 1989 represent the repudiation of communist ideology and the triumph of capitalism.' Discuss.

So the case appears to be closed. According to Stokes "there is little doubt what the greatest lesson of 1989 is: communism failed"(1). Moreover as Hutton states "the great ideological contest of the twentieth century has been settled. Free market capitalism has won; state planning and communism, of which social-market capitalism is alleged to be a subset has lost"(2). Whilst Kellner has recently identified three fundamental changes that are transforming the world: the globalisation of economic forces, the shift from machine-based to information-based industry *and the triumph of liberal capitalism over state socialism*(3).

Yet if we accept as Mason does that "the year 1989 marked a turning point in world history"(4), and that the revolutions themselves unequivocally changed the political, economic, and cultural map of the world, it still does not prevent a substantial qualification to the opening remarks. Whilst it is axiomatic then as Tismaneanu states "the importance of these revolutions cannot therefore be overestimated"(5), it is nevertheless crucial to focus on Isaac's argument that "intellectual history since 1789 proves that it is impossible to arrive at a single interpretation of events of such magnitude"(6). Historians and writers have argued about the meaning of the French Revolution for the last two hundred years. What events have shaped the past and have helped to define our political identities are continually reassessed and redefined, leaving history in this sense to have no absolute or final meaning. So as Isaac further states "there is surely a range of possible interpretations of 1989"(7).

In refuting the banality of a monistic stance it is not my intention to simply take Fukuyama to task in his singular interpretation of the 1989 revolutions as signifying "a fundamental process at work that dictates a common evolutionary pattern for *all* human societies - in short, something like a Universal History of mankind in the direction of liberal democracy"(8). I do wish to show that the revolutions of 1989 had many and various causes, and seriously question the validity of the argument that has insisted on an unrivalled victory in the shape of neoliberalism and capitalism. To this extent it is not enough simply to recite the shortcomings that can be readily identified with capitalism, but rather portray a workable and viable alternative

Ex without intro

socialist or social democratic programme, that indeed is not purely confined to academic debate.

Of greater significance is the fact that a number of centre left governments within the European Union, continuing into the 21<sup>st</sup> century endorse and espouse progressive social democratic programmes that encapsulate traditional and fundamental left wing values, in response to the forces of globalisation and technological innovation that are sweeping across much of the western world. Equally as important to the European social democrats is a highly critical view of capitalism as an economic system. Rather the very essence of democratic socialism is evident in the 'struggle for social justice', the fight against discrimination, and for a 'fairer distribution of benefits'(9).

However before asking what the events of 1989 really mean, and considering the concomitant success or otherwise of capitalism, it is worth deliberating on the very nature of revolutions themselves, and in particular whether what transpired in Eastern Europe during 1989 actually constituted a genuine revolution. Whilst Dahrendorf has warned that this "question may be academic, of more interest to university students than to those involved"(10), it is important to consider as this one aspect alone has evoked fervent debate amongst scholars and historians alike. On the one hand Stokes asserts that "if one believes that a widespread change in government personnel, coupled with total rejection of the philosophy of the previous system, dynamic efforts to utterly transform an economic system, and the creation of a new social basis for rule constitute a revolution - whatever the level of violence - then 1989 was a year of revolution"(11). The phrase *whatever the level of violence* is of particular significance. Integral to Giddens definition of a revolution is the *threat or use of violence*. This is amplified when he states "revolutions are political changes brought about in the face of opposition from the pre-existing authorities, who cannot be persuaded to relinquish their power without the threatened or actual of violent means"(12).

Some commentators have had difficulty in accepting the events in Eastern Europe in 1989 as genuine revolutions particularly because of their mostly peaceful nature. Their non-violent character has specifically led Nolte to refer to them as 'incomplete'(13). The remarkable and startling changes in Poland, Hungary, and East Germany by the fall of 1989, had clearly demonstrated what could be accomplished by grass roots activism, and internal party reform, as opposed to violent confrontation(14). Outstanding

as they were then, Romania excluded, for their amazingly peaceful nature, is it therefore still possible to refer to the events of 1989 as genuine revolutions?

If the answer to this is positive, then two immediate considerations should be borne in mind. Firstly how is their novelty assessed in contrast to similar events, for example the French Revolution of 1789? Secondly Tismaneanu argues that "unlike traditional revolutions they did not originate in a doctrinarian vision of the perfect society and rejected the role of any self-appointed vanguard in directing the activities of the masses"(15).

The enormity of the changes produced by the 1989 revolutions has prompted parallels with other such epochal events as the French Revolution of 1789. Both can be seen to have had far reaching domestic and international effects. Yet Garton Ash has drawn closer parallels between the springtime of nations in the 1848 European revolutions and the year 1989. Whilst he acknowledges the role played by both economic and social factors, particular emphasis is placed on the prominence of the intellectual aspect, leaving the greatest common denominator between 1848 and 1989 as ideological(16). Moreover he asserts "the inner history of these revolutions is that a set of ideas whose time had come, and a set of ideas whose time had gone"(17).

Yet above all it should be remembered that whatever analyses are used to define a revolution, or in comparing and contrasting it with any other, social, economic, political and cultural elements offer only partial insights. There are many ways of looking at the Revolution of 1989, and as Chirot states "everything was interconnected, yet no single analysis can entirely absorb all aspects of such cataclysmic events"(18).

It is also worth remembering that significant *differences* remain in the way the events of 1989 compare to previous revolutions. No political party headed the spontaneous momentum in 1989, paving the way for a new perfect society (evident as there was in the 1917 Russian Revolution). There was in 1989 as Garton Ash acknowledges "an extraordinary, creative departure from European revolutions as they had been known since 1789: the roundtable replaced the guillotine"(19).

Some historians like Schopflin argue that the events of 1989 can be best be resolved by reformulating the definition of a revolution. He refers to a 'negotiated revolution', meaning the way in which a bargaining process

produced a far-reaching transfer of power and redefinition of political legitimation. For Schopflin "the events more closely resembled a peaceful transfer of power, a constitutional process rather than a caesura implied by the word revolution"(20).

Arguably though it is not agreeing as to what constitutes a revolution that is of primary importance. According to Tismaneanu what is beyond doubt "is the world-historical impact of the transformations inaugurated by the events of 1989"(21). Rather what should focus our minds then is the fact that the events of 1989 had *revolutionary consequences*.

Yet as Rutland has reminded us "the 1989 revolutions were curious, one-sided revolutions. The people rose up against the state, but the state refused to fight back"(22). Puzzlement and ambiguity are also seen as clouds over the events of 1989. Though whatever term most aptly applies to the events of 1989 it would appear futile to disagree with Dahrendorf when he states "at the end of the day, they led to the delegitimation of an entire ruling class and the replacement of most of its key members, as well as a constitutional transformation with far-reaching consequences"(23).

In turning to explore an equally contentious issue - the factors that most adequately account for the fall of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989, here again a plethora of explanations have been offered. A cornerstone to my understanding the 1989 revolutions is the rejection of the monocausal interpretation. It would also appear incongruous to highlight only one failure and attribute this as the sole reason delineating the demise of communism. A number of factors therefore can be identified. The main defects associated with the socialist economies in Eastern Europe have been well documented over the years. During the Brezhnev era Hobsbawm has pointed to the combination of incompetence and corruption(24), whilst a rather simplistic argument offered by Brown implies that communism in Eastern Europe was doomed and irreformable from the start. He further states "politically, economically, and above all, morally - communism was imposed by force and had to be maintained by force"(25). Furthermore Dahrendorf appears equally convinced that "communism never worked"(26).

So whilst it would be clearly futile therefore to dismiss out of hand the overall political, economic, social and moral shortcomings of communism, there are nevertheless some propitious indicators that suggest it was not a wholesale

disaster *per se*. For instance Hobsbawm has alluded to the fact that "in the first fifteen years after the Second World War the economies of the 'socialist camp' grew considerably faster than those of the West, so much so that Soviet leaders like Nikita Khrushchev sincerely believed that, the curve of their growth continuing upwards at the same rate, socialism would outproduce capitalism within a foreseeable future; as indeed did the British premier Harold Macmillan"(27). Whereas the survival of the Soviet Union can be seen to have had profound, often positive implications for those outside the Soviet borders. The immense and irreplaceable contribution to the defeat of Nazism, and the way in which welfare and social provision were often at their most generous in those European states bordering the former Soviet bloc, often introduced when the Soviet Union was at its zenith in the early postwar period, are qualifications raised by Blackburn to counter the rather trite remarks promulgated by Brown and others that communism was simply doomed from birth. It goes without saying though that none of these facts justify in any way the egregious criminality and callousness for which Stalin was renowned, as in fact the purges and famines for which he was responsible served to weaken rather than strengthen the Soviet Union(28).

In returning to the consideration of the main causes that contributed to the collapse of communism in 1989, much ink has been spilt to this end. Four explanations have been given by Sowards, namely *collapse* due to economic failure, *collapse* due to the arms race, *collapse* due to 'perestroika' in the Soviet Union and *collapse* due to the rise of alternatives of communism(29). In addition amongst factors recognised by Schopflin are the loss of support from pro-regime intellectuals and the international dimension(30).

Looking at some of these underlying causes in slightly more depth, there is no question for example that economic problems were one of the most visible reasons behind the collapse of East European communism.

As Chirot has stated "the main problem is that investment and production decisions were based largely, though not entirely, on political will rather than domestic or international market pressures"(31). As a full-blown alternative system to capitalism, communism clearly fell short and as Blackburn acknowledges "in the seventies and eighties, capitalism, despite its own problems and injustices, proved itself productively superior to the Soviet-type economies"(32). Managers in such economies were judged by their ability to maintain high employment, and produce more rather than concentrating on producing marketable goods more efficiently. Furthermore a shortage of

desired goods was prevalent throughout much of Eastern Europe. Even in Hungary for example where it proved possible to carry out some reform, in small-scale agricultural production, the fact that the managers were so closely tied to the ruling political machinery in large industries ruled out the possibility of any real change.

When during the 1970s Eastern European Communist states pursued high-risk development strategies that relied on foreign loans to pay for construction of modernised economies, serious difficulties were not far off. When oil prices rose in 1973 and 1979 and slowed the world economy, the Bloc states could no longer make payments on their debts, and this in turn led to a loss of credit and internal economic problems from which they never recovered(33).

Closely associated with a collapse due to *economic failure* is the collapse due to the *arms race*. Here again this has been viewed as an economic crisis - the American military pressure and the costs of the arms race were extremely prohibitive. Under Presidents Carter, Reagan, and Bush the United States forced the Soviets to spend so much money on high-tech weapons that the communist economy was bankrupted, after too many resources were diverted from productive investments and consumer needs(34).

Yet if possessing a cognizance of economic problems is of fundamental importance in grappling with the underlying causes the events of 1989, it is according to Chirot "nevertheless the changing moral and political climate of Eastern Europe that really destroyed communism there"(35). Or as Stokes has put it "if anything is clear about the sudden swoon of the hollow East European regimes in November and December 1989 it is that those collapses were the result of moral rot at least as much as of economic or political failure"(36). He is emphatic when he adds "it was not economic deprivation that brought the people onto the streets in Eastern Europe and November and December 1989. They had suffered economic hardship for a long time, and in countries like Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, times were not even that hard. It was their humiliation, their disgust with the falsity of their regimes, their desire for freedom"(37).

The *politics* of the revolution according to Garton Ash were not made by the peasants and workers, rather by the intellectuals - the playwright Havel, the philosophers Kis and Tamas in Budapest, the painter Bohley in Berlin are all cited as examples of an intellectual phenomenon. In a lucid way Garton Ash

also draws on de Tocqueville's exposition from over a century ago highlighting the 'ruling elite's loss of belief in its own right to rule', as a central theme in the Eastern European revolutions(38).

Yet it appears a historical irony concerning in essence the very success of communism that, in creating a more educated, more urban, more aware population - this also created the potential for disintegration. The level of political awareness was particularly high - due in no small part to the fact that everyone was provided with at least a basic education, and from the earliest years that education was highly politicised(39).

So whatever name is given to the thing that was installed so comprehensively installed throughout countries in Eastern Europe after 1949 - Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the GDR to name but a few, whether it be termed socialism, real existing socialism, communism or something else, it appeared all so clear. The moral base of communism had vanished, the elites had lost confidence in their legitimacy, and of the very ideals and values that had first heralded its arrival - freedom, justice, human rights, equality before the law and equal opportunities for every member of society - it had singularly founded in precisely those areas where its founders said it could best succeed(40). As for the effect this would have in turn for the place that had given communism its birth - Hobsbawm likens "a crippled giant tanker moving towards the reefs, a rudderless Soviet Union therefore drifted towards disintegration"(41).

Surely then this leaves only one conclusion, or one salient outcome from the astonishing events of 1989 - a vindication of Fukuyama's interpretation leaving "liberal democracy as the only coherent political aspiration that spans different regions and cultures around the globe"(42). Indeed the 'end of ideology' thesis, revived by the collapse of communism in Europe portrays the final point in humanity's ideological evolution, with free market capitalism the final victor(43). Fukuyama's short article appeared in a neoconservative American journal, the *National Interest* in the summer of 1989 titled 'The End of History', which later developed into a book 'The End of History and the Last Man'. His thesis has attracted widespread and poignant criticism for a lack of originality, rigour and a misinterpretation of history. Whilst he stands accused of being intoxicated with Hegelian theory, at the same time he has also been criticised for a highly selective reading of Hegel.

This specifically relates to the reference that the triumph of capitalism, leaves no other future, and that the historical narrative thus ends(44). As Rustin points out to the contrary "Hegel knew that the relationship between human understanding and its objects was more complicated than this"(45).

Notwithstanding the criticism that has been leveled at Fukuyama, and in spite of significant disagreements, Isaac still acknowledges that "many liberal analysts concur that the transition to liberal democracy is the principal issue on the agenda today"(46). In a very cogent way however he turns the whole question around and argues that we should look in which *sense or senses* liberalism has triumphed, not whether it has triumphed *per se*, for the liberal interpretation itself, he infers is politically and morally flawed.

These *senses* in which liberalism can be seen to have triumphed, though not unambiguously, include a practical triumph of *liberal democratic institutions*, and a liberal vindication through viewing *liberalism as an ethical-political imperative*(47).

In the first instance it is clear that the downfall of communism has paved the way for *liberal democratic institutions* - separation of powers, party systems and regular competitive elections to be put in place. Notwithstanding the undoubted and extensive fragmentation apparent in Russia's party system, and the assertion that its internal politics are fuelled by greed, there is widespread acceptance of democratic systems throughout Eastern Europe. Furthermore the rapid and continuous change that has taken place in the communist world since the 1980s tends sometimes overshadow the magnitude of what has happened. The political triumph of liberalism in this sense would prove difficult to deny(48).

In another sense Isaac has argued that whilst the success of liberalism is certainly not yet assured, liberal democracy as Churchill once famously said 'provides the least bad form of government'. However imperfect it is, then the alternatives to it are demonstrably undesirable. So the triumph of liberalism in an ethical-political imperative is left intact(49).

Does this leave therefore an unequivocal and unrivalled triumph for capitalism as a result of the events of 1989? Not so, or not at least according to Miliband, Giddens, Marquand, and Taylor. Even Dahrendorf who is purported to possess an avowedly liberal overtone acknowledges that "the countries of East Central Europe have not shed their communist system in

I think he said 'is the worst form of government', apart from all the others'

order to embrace the capitalist system (whatever that is); they have shed a closed system in order to create an open society”(50).

Capitalist societies throughout the world are marked by their immense resources, yet Miliband draws attention to the appalling poverty, injustice, illiteracy, unemployment and insecurity that bedevil the very same societies. Moreover both he and Schopflin draw distinct differences between Soviet communism and a socialist democracy. They both argue rigorously that the two have nothing in common, with democratic socialism traditionally involving commitment to *social justice, equality and respect for the individual*(51). Miliband has also proposed a Socialist Alternative, and even though written in 1992, at a time when it was hardly conducive to receive a benign response, advocates policies which in turn receive endorsement by a number of mainstream centre left governments within the European Union today(52). Centre left governments now run eleven of the fifteen countries in the European Union, and Taylor has pointed to how fundamental left wing values of *solidarity, freedom and equality* do not just serve as empty rhetoric, but that “European social democrats have translated their eternal values into successful political action, and done so while avoiding the vacuities of the Third Way”(53). Miliband’s calls in 1992 for a socialist democracy embracing the main means of economic activity, whether under public, social, or cooperative ownership, with the greatest possible degree of democratic participation and control, appear the very essence underpinning the social cohesion impressively achieved by many European countries that are run by social democrats. Furthermore Taylor has shown how Lionel Jospin the French prime minister has even evoked the methodology of Marxism, as a way of looking at the capitalist system - to reform, challenge and control it(54).

It would appear that neither capitalism nor neoliberalism can provide an answer to the main dilemma facing countries across the world today as raised by Dahrendorf – “how can we create sustainable conditions of economic improvement in global markets without sacrificing the basic solidarity or cohesion of our societies or the institutions of the constitution of liberty?”(55). At least according to Lloyd “ten years on, we should have learnt that a one-way stream of enlightenment from west to east, is not the answer”(56).

slightly questionable  
I think

It is also worth adhering to Marquand's statement that "the triumphalist neoliberals of ten years ago, who assumed that the collapse of socialism would drag social down with it, had forgotten their history"(57). Indeed rampant capitalism has created a movement to subject market forces to human needs, with the chief beneficiaries being the social democrats. Giddens is even more scathing when he asserts that neoliberalism "has not only run out of steam, it was a thoroughly inadequate and self-contradictory philosophy to begin with"(58).

After taking all the complex arguments into account is it really possible to reach a definitive conclusion about the real meanings of 1989, and to make a judgement about what it all means in terms of world history?

Stokes is in no doubt "that the basic lesson of 1989, then, is that the twentieth century is over"(59). Whilst for Fowkes the revolutions of 1989 "overthrew a structure which had long been hollowed out from within"(60). He further asserts that "communism survives as an ideal; and it will continue to do so as long as there are people who dream of replacing the anarchy of capitalism by a rational and just organisation of society. But the governmental episode is over"(61). What then about history, is that over? There will be a future according to Hobsbawm, and of that there can be no doubt - "the only completely certain generalization about history is that, so long as there is a human race, it will go on"(62).

In closing though perhaps we should return to the *moral* aspect, as communism's *moral failure* in Eastern Europe as highlighted, has been regarded as pivotal to gaining a true understanding behind the events of 1989. A stark warning here has been issued by Hutton to those celebrating a triumph of capitalism, and he insists that unless western capitalism accepts its responsibility to the social and political world where it is embedded, it is heading for perdition(63). Moreover he states "the demand for a moral economy is not simply the assertion of a different value system. It is a call to arms in a world in which time is running short"(64).

## References

1. Stokes, G. (1997) Three Eras of Political Change in Eastern Europe, New York, Oxford, p 182
2. Hutton, W. (1996) The State We're In, London, Vintage, p 16
3. see Kellner, P. "Bring back the e-word", in New Statesman, 13 December 1999, p 25
4. Mason, D. (1992) Revolution in East-Central Europe, Boulder CO, Westview, p 1
5. Tismaneanu, V. (1999) The revolutions of 1989, London, Routledge, p 1 (introduction)
6. Issac, J. C. "The Meanings of 1989", in Tismaneanu, V (ed), The revolutions of 1989, London, Routledge, 1999, p 126
7. *Ibid.* p 126
8. Fukuyama, F. (1992) The End of History and the Last Man, London, Hamish Hamilton, p 48
9. see Taylor, R. "The social democrats come roaring back", in New Statesman, 20 December 1999- 3 January 2000 p 25-27
10. Dahrendorf, R. (1990) Reflections on the Revolution in Europe, London, Chatto & Windus, p 5
11. Stokes, G. (1997) Three Eras of Political Change in Eastern Europe, New York, Oxford, p 182
12. Giddens, A. (1993) Sociology (2<sup>nd</sup> edition), Oxford, Polity Press, p 620

13. see Arato, A. (1993), "Interpreting 1989", in Social Research, 60(3), (Fall 1993), esp p 612-615 – this refers to Nolte's concept of an *incomplete revolution* in 1989. This section also goes on to make the marked differential between an *incomplete revolution* and a *self limiting revolution*, when referring to Eastern Europe in 1989.

14. see Mason, D. (1992), Revolution in East Central Europe, Boulder CO, Westview, p 62

15. Tismaneanu, V. (1999) The revolutions of 1989, London, Routledge, p 1 (introduction)

16. see Garton Ash, T, "The year of truth", in Tismaneanu, V (ed), The revolutions of 1989, London, Routledge, p 111-113

17. *Ibid.* p 112

18. Chirot, D. "What happened in Eastern Europe in 1989?", in Tismaneanu, V (ed), The revolutions of 1989, London, Routledge, 1999, p 20

19. Garton Ash, T. "Ten years in Europe", in Prospect, July 1999, p 22

20. Schopflin, G. (1993) Politics in Eastern Europe, Oxford, Blackwell, p 254

21. Tismaneanu, V. (1999) The revolutions of 1989, London, Routledge, p 4 (introduction)

22. Rutland, P. "The Meaning of 1989", in Transitions, 6(1), January 1999, p 25

23. Dahrendorf, R (1990) Reflections on the Revolution in Europe, London, Chatto & Windus, p 5-6

24. see Hobsbawm, E (1994), Age of Extremes, London, Michael Joseph, p 473-475 – this refers to the basic failings of the socialist economies in Eastern Europe & the USSR. Another useful source is Chirot, D. “What happened in Eastern Europe in 1989?”, in Tismaneanu V (ed), in The revolutions of 1989, London, Routledge, p 20-26 - he makes specific reference to how *Soviet-type economies* found particular difficulty in adapting to a ‘fourth age’ industrial phenomenon of automobiles, consumer electrical goods, and wider *services* to the public at large. Further reference is made here to a ‘fifth age’ of electronics, and information technology, with which Chirot states, they also struggled.

25. Brown, J. F. (1991) Surge to Freedom: The End of Communist Rule in Eastern Europe, Twickenham, Adamantine Press, p 7

26. Dahrendorf, R. (1990) Reflections on the Revolution in Europe, London, Chatto & Windus, p 15

27. Hobsbawm, E. (1994) Age of Extremes, London, Michael Joseph, p 377

28. see Blackburn, R. (1991), “Fin de Siecle: Socialism after the Crash”, in New Left Review, 185, p 24

29. see Sowards, S. W. (1996), “The failure of Balkan Communism and the causes of the Revolutions of 1989”, <http://www.lib.msu.edu/sowards/Balkan/lect24.htm>, p 1

30. see Schopflin, G. (1993), Politics in Eastern Europe, Oxford, Blackwell, p 226-236

31. Chirot, D. “What happened in Eastern Europe in 1989?”, in Tismaneanu, V (ed), The revolutions of 1989, London, Routledge, 1999, p 21

32. Blackburn, R. (1991) "Fin de Siecle: Socialism after the Crash", in New Left Review, 185, p 42
33. see Sowards, S. W. (1996), "The failure of Balkan Communism and the causes of the Revolutions of 1989"  
<http://www.lib.msu.edu/sowards/Balkan/lect24.htm>, p 1
34. *Ibid.* p 1
35. Chirot, D. "What happened in Eastern Europe in 1989?", in Tismaneanu, V (ed), The revolutions of 1989, London, Routledge, 1999, p 26
36. Stokes, G. (1997) Three Eras of Political Change in Eastern Europe, New York, Oxford, p 186
37. *Ibid.* p 186
38. see Garton Ash, T. "The year of truth", in Tismaneanu, V (ed), The revolutions of 1989, London, Routledge, 1999, p 115
39. *Ibid.* p 118
40. see Brown, J. F. (1991), Surge to Freedom: The End of Communist Rule in Eastern Europe, Twickenham, Adamantine Press, p 43
41. Hobsbawm, E. (1994) Age of Extremes, London, Michael Joseph, p 484
42. Fukuyama, F. (1992) The End of History and the Last Man, London, Hamish Hamilton, p xiii

43. see Gamble, A. "Conclusion: Politics 2000", in Dunleavy P, et al (eds), Developments in British Politics 5, Basingstoke, MacMillan Press 1997, p 361-364
44. see Rustin, M. (1992), "No Exit from Capitalism?", in New Left Review, 193, p 104-106
45. *Ibid.* p 106
46. Isaac, J. C. "The Meanings of 1989", in Tismaneanu, V (ed), The revolutions of 1989, London, Routledge, p 127
47. *Ibid.* p 127-135 (Isaac argues here how in *specific ways liberal democracy can be seen to have triumphed*. He also adds a further sense – as *the fulfillment of the democratic opposition to communism*).
48. *Ibid.* p 131. see also Lloyd, J. "The secret policemen's plot", in New Statesmen, 16 August 1999, p 8
49. see Isaac, J. C. "The Meanings of 1989", in Tismaneanu, V (ed), The revolutions of 1989, London, Routledge, p 132
50. Dahrendorf, R. (1990) Reflections on the Revolution in Europe, London, Chatto & Windus, p 36
51. see Miliband, R. (1992), "Fukuyama and the Socialist Alternative" in New Left Review, 193, p 109. See also Schopflin, G. (1993), Politics in Eastern Europe, Oxford, Blackwell, p 225

52. see Taylor, R. "The social democrats come roaring back", in New Statesmen, 20 December 1999-3 January 2000 p 25 & 26. Here Taylor refers to the *Declaration of Paris*, signed in November 1999 at the Socialist International conference. This document formulates a wide ranging exposition of fundamental left-wing values, especially in response to the threat of the continuing forces of globalisation. Whilst the document is sharply critical of American style neoliberal values, Taylor specifically notes how such countries as Sweden and Denmark for example have managed to successfully modernise, implement largely democratic socialist programmes, and at the same time avoid the vacuities of the *Third Way*, as espoused by *New Labour* in Britain.

53. *Ibid.* p 26

54. *Ibid.* p 26

55. Dahrendorf, R. "Whatever happened to liberty?", in New Statesmen, 6 September 1999, p 25

56. Lloyd, J. "Stranded between two worlds", in New Statesmen, 6 December 1999, p 30

57. Marquand, D. "A philosophy that would not die", in New Statesmen, 26 February 1999, p 25

58. Giddens, A "Centre left at centre left stage", in New Statesmen, May 1997 Special Edition, p 37

59. Stokes, G. (1997) Three Eras of Political Change in Eastern Europe, New York, Oxford, p 189

60. Fowkes, B. (1995) The Rise and Fall of Communism in Eastern Europe (2<sup>nd</sup> edition), Basingstoke, MacMillan Press, p 197
61. *Ibid.* p 1-2
62. Hobsbawm, E. (1994) Age of Extremes, London, Michael Joseph, p 6
63. see Hutton, W. (1996), The State we're In, London, Vintage, p 26
64. *Ibid.* p 26

## Bibliography

- Arato, Andrew, (1993), "Interpreting 1989", in Social Research, 60(3), (Fall 1993), p 609-646
- Blackburn, Robin, (1991), "Fin de Siecle: Socialism after the Crash", in New Left Review, 185, p 5-66
- Brown, Jim F, (1991), Surge to Freedom: The End of Communist Rule in Eastern Europe, Twickenham, Adamantine Press
- Chirot, Daniel, "What happened in Eastern Europe in 1989?", in Tismaneanu, Vladimir (ed), The revolutions of 1989, London, Routledge, 1999, p 19-50
- Dahrendorf, Ralph, "Whatever happened to liberty?", in New Statesman, 6 September 1999, p 25-27
- Dahrendorf, Ralph, (1990), Reflections on the Revolution in Europe, London, Chatto & Windus
- Dworkin Anthony, "The great synthesiser", in Prospect, July 1999, p 54-56
- Fowkes, Ben, (1995), The Rise and Fall of Communism in Eastern Europe (2<sup>nd</sup> edition), Basingstoke, MacMillan Press
- Fukuyama, Francis, (1992), The End of History and the Last Man, London, Hamish Hamilton
- Gamble, Andrew, "Conclusion: Politics 2000", in Dunleavy P, et al (eds), Developments in British Politics 5, Basingstoke, MacMillan Press, 1997, p 355-376
- Garton Ash, Timothy, "Ten years in Europe", in Prospect, July 1999, p 22-27
- Garton Ash, Timothy, "The year of truth", in Tismaneanu, Vladimir (ed), The revolutions of 1989, London, Routledge, 1999, p 108-124

Giddens, Anthony, "Centre left at centre stage", in New Statesman, May 1997 Special Edition, p 37-39

Giddens, Anthony, (1993), Sociology (2<sup>nd</sup> edition), Oxford, Polity Press

Hobsbawm, Eric, (1994), Age of Extremes, London, Michael Joseph

Hutton, Will, (1996), The State We're In, London, Vintage

Isaac, Jeffrey C, "The Meanings of 1989", in Tismaneanu, Vladimir (ed), The revolutions of 1989, London, Routledge, 1999, p 125-164

Kellner, Peter, "Bring back the e-word", in New Statesman, 13 December 1999, p 25-27

Lloyd, John, "The secret policemen's plot", in New Statesman, 16 August 1999, p 8-9

Lloyd, John, "Stranded between two worlds", in New Statesman, 6 December 1999, p 29-30

Marquand, David, "A philosophy that would not die", in New Statesman, 26 February 1999, p 25-27

Mason, David, (1992), Revolution in East-Central Europe, Boulder CO, Westview

Miliband, Ralph, (1992), "Fukuyama and the Socialist Alternative", in New Left Review, 193, p 108-113

Rustin, Michael, (1992), "No Exit from Capitalism?", in New Left Review, 193, p 96-107

Rutland, Peter, "The Meaning of 1989", in Transitions, 6(1), January 1999, p 24-28

Schopflin, George, (1993), Politics in Eastern Europe, Oxford, Blackwell

Sowards, Steven W, (1996), "The failure of Balkan Communism and the causes of the Revolutions of 1989",

<http://www.lib.msu.edu/sowards/balkan/lect24.htm>

Stokes, Gale, (1997), Three Eras of Political Change in Eastern Europe, New York, Oxford

Taylor, Robert, "The social democrats come roaring back", in New Statesman, 20 December 1999-3 January 2000, p 25-27

Tismaneanu, Vladimir, (1999), The revolutions of 1989, London, Routledge, (intro p 1-16)

*(introduction' in Tismaneanu, V. (ed))*  
*even when the editors the same*  
*give full details*